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A LOGICIAN'S REFLECTIONS ON THE 
DEBITUM CONTRAHENDI PECCATUM:sr. 
The long-standing theological debate over whether Our 
Blessed Mother can be said to have had a debitum peccati be-
gins and ends, it seems, with both sides admitting the truth 
of the following contrary-to-fact condition: . 
(A) If she had not been preserved, Mary would have con-
tracted original sin.1 
The necessity of affirming this or similar counterfactuals is 
usually said to lie in the Church's doctrine that Our Lady's 
redemption was a "preservative" redemption. It is asked, what 
can "preservative" mean, if an assertion like (A) is not true? 
Of course, once (A) is admitted, it seems to become more 
difficult for those who reject the debitum peccati to maintain 
their position. For if (A) is true, there must be some reason, 
cause, or law which makes it true-a law to which Mary was 
"subject." The defenders of the debitum can claim that the 
term means no more than this; whereupon they seem to win 
by default. 
The purpose of the present writer is rather a radical one-: 
it is to prove that the debitum peccati is a logical absurdity. 
I argue that its defense does indeed require, as starting point, 
a true and informative counterfactual. (A) is excluded be-
cause it is a thinly disguised tautology. I then experiment with 
*The author wishes to thank Fr. ]. B. Carol, O.F.M., for his kindness 
in reading an earlier draft of this paper, and Prof. Carl Kordig of George-
town for his advice on formal logical matters. Their suggestions and 
criticisms have greatly improved the present version, whose remaining 
shortcomings are solely, of course, the author's responsibility. 
1 Fr. C. BaliC's proposal at the 1954 International Mariological Con-
gress: "B. Virgo Maria peccatrtm originate contraxisset, nisi praeservata 
frtisset." Cf. Virgo Immamlata 11 (1957) 499. 
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alternative counterfactuals and find them, one and all, unac-
ceptable. 
The overall argument, then, falls into two parts. The first 
part seeks to reduce the entire case for the debitum peccati to 
the tenability of a counterfactual, and the second part attacks 
that tenability, especially in the light of recent work by formal 
logicians on the meaning of the counterfactual connective. This 
work may fairly be said to have begun .with a paper of H. Hiz 
in 1951,2 and was well summarized last year by Howard C. 
Wasserman.3 To this writer's knowledge, such work has never 
before been applied to the debitum question. 
The present article contains, however, only the first part 
of the total argument; the second will be published in a sequel, 
which will be entitled, A Critique of Marian Counterfactuals. 
In order to avoid all appearance of theological polemic, the 
author has rarely attributed the various positions discussed in 
the two parts of this paper to the particular theologians, living 
and dead, who held them. As a result, no attempt has been 
made to supply a bibliography of the traditional literature, 
since this work has been done ably by others.4 
0.0.1. It will be granted that the debitum peccati, if ~rue, is 
a theological conclusion. Theological conclusions are supposed 
to emerge from the data of revelation (and sometimes also 
from those of right reason) as bonae consequentiae. Hence 
2 H. Hiz, Comments and Criticisms on the Inferential Sense of Con-
trary-to-Fact Conditionals, in The Jomnal of Philosophy 48 (1951) 
586-587 
8 H. C. Wasserman, An Analysis of the Cormterfactual Conditional, in 
Notre Dame fomnal of Formal Logic 17 (1976) 395-400. 
4 What may well be the definitive bibliography has been prepared by the 
eminent American Mariologist, Fr. ]. B. Carol, O.F.M., in The Blessed 
Virgin and the "Debitttm Peccati." A Bibliographical Conspecttts, in 
Marian Studies 28 (1977) 181-256. The bibliography appears considerably 
enhanced in Father Carol's new book, A History of the Controversy over 
the Debitum Peccati (Franciscan Institute Publications, St. Bonaventure, 
New York, 1978). 
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it would seem that a case for holding the debitum must proceed 
by constructing one or more syllogisms whose conclusio~ is 
the· desired proposition. In this case, it is easy to see wh~t sort 
of syllogism is required: one needs a major :w:hich p!'edicates 
rrd~bet peccatum contrahere" of all· the members of a certaiq 
class; and one needs a minor which identifies Mary as a mem-
ber of that class. 
0.0.2. Secondly, one must assume that debet is to mean some-
thing more than "wou~d have." If the reader is already con-
vinced that Our Lady's debitum is untenable unless it only 
means that she "would have" contracted original sin, had God 
not prevented it, he must await the sequel to this pape~. Here, 
we are concerned with theories which give debet some uncon-
ditional force of "owe," "ought," "had to" or "sho~ld have." 
0.0.3. This distinctive force brings to light a second require-
men_t which the syllogism establishing the debitum peccati must 
meet. Whereas the notions of original sin, who con~racts it; 
why and how, are all revealed (more ot less), the notion of a 
"necessity" or "obligation" to contract it is not revealed. Hence 
the major of the required syllogism ( s) cannot presuppose or 
merely posit the "obligation." Rather, the "obligation" itself 
must emerge as the sound conclusion of a theological proof. 
· 0.0.4. Now before we investigate how such a syllogism might 
be constructed, let us face a more primitive option. Suppose 
we already have our desired syllogism in hand, with its desired 
conclusion: Maria debet peccatum contt·ahere. The fact re-
mains that she didn't contract it. So the option is this: should 
we say the obligation was waived, or the necessity dissolved, 
in her case? It would seem so. But notice that if an obligation 
is waived, it is waived. That person for whom an obligation 
is waived is, precisely, not obliged. Hence, if the obligation 
was waived in her case, Mary was not obliged to contract orig-
inal sin~ and the stipulated syllogism is false. 
0.0.5.' Here the defender of the debitum has three moves 
from which to choose. · · · · 
3
Marshner: A Logician's Reflections on the Debitum
Published by eCommons, 1978
A Logician's Reflections on the Debitum 137 
(1) He can accept th'at Mary was not really obliged and 
thus reduce his own position to· a matter 'of words. He can say 
that the quarrel was a matter of words from the outset.' But 
one must retort that, if he still speaks ·of a debitum, then his 
use of words is inconsistent. 
(2) He can raise the obligation to the second power, so to 
speak. Suppose the descendants of Adam, if not oblig~d to 
contract, are at least obliged to be 'obliged to contract. Then 
Our L~dy was obliged to be obliged, but ·God didn't in fact 
oblige her. In other words, it remains true that she "ought 
to have been obliged."5 However, as soon ·as one sees that 
the basis for alleging the. obligation to be obligated is no di£-' 
ferent from the basis for alleging the obligation in the first 
place, it becomes clear that this solution only postpones the 
problem. One then considers a third move. · · · 
(3) The defender of the debitum can say that in Mary's 
case the obligation was not waived. In that case, she was truly 
obliged or necessitated but was mercifully prevented by God 
from r.peeting the requirement. In this way, one arrives at a 
debitum peccati which seems to have substance. There is a 
debitttm "in" Our Lady which consists precisely in the real' 
attachment to her of that necessity which her Savior preserved 
her from fulfilling. Subject to a·"law" of God's making, she 
broke it by God's doing. Because God broke His own law, 
she lacks the sin; because He broke it rather than w;uved it, 
sh~ has the debt of sin. On this interpretation, the desiderated 
syllogism is restored to g<>?d repute. · 
So far as I can see, there are no other options for the debitum-: 
defender. He may choose to word the third option a bit differ-
enlty than I have done, but the gist will remain so long as he 
s Such is the position taken by those who defend the debit11m remotum; 
at least in some versions. Cf., for example, G. M. Roschini, O.S.M., II 
problema del 'debitrtm peccati' in Maria Santissima, in Virgo Immac11lata 
11 (1957) 343-355. 
4
Marian Studies, Vol. 29 [1978], Art. 12
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/marian_studies/vol29/iss1/12
138 A Logician's Reflections on the Debit11m 
holds that there is an obligation or necessity which did bind 
Mary and was not simply waived. 
0.0.6. With this choice clarified, we turn to the needed syl-
logisms. We have seen that both the notion of debitttm and 
its attachment to Mary must be demonstrated, presumably in 
that order. I think it will be agreed that there are only two 
possible starting points: either the revealed data concerning 
original sin and its transmission or else the meaning of the 
Immaculate Conception itself. 
1.0.0. Let us see what happens if one begins from the data 
on original sin (the so-called termintts a qtto of Our Lady's. 
redemption) .il From these data, one or more "laws" must 
emerge (taking "law" in a broad and analogical sense), so 
that Mary's case, considered in abstraction from the divine in-
tervention, emerges as a case covered by a law. 
1.1.0. The first task, then, is to get clear the "laws" in ques-
tion. 
6 Recent theological reflection has proposed substantially new ways 
of understanding these data. For example, M. Flick and Z. Alszeghy, 
in their Fondamenti di rtna antropologia teologica (Libreria Editrice Fi-
orentina, 1969), provide a large bibliography. Because the new tendencies 
are very diverse, and in some respects discordant among themselves, it 
would be tedious to take all of them into account in the argumentation 
of this paper. Indeed, it is not clear that the problematic of the debitum 
can even arise according to some of these views. Nevertheless, even if 
there is a tenable theology of original sin within which the debitrtm issue 
cannot arise, there are certainly other tenable views within which it can 
continue to arise, at least in some form. For example, nothing essential 
to the debit11m problem depends on whether or not the referent of the 
proper name "Adam" is a single, physical person. Nor does it matter 
whether our solidarity with Adam be conceived primarily in juridical 
terms or in mystical terms, so long as some bond of solidarity is affirmed. 
Therefore, the mode of exposition adopted in this paper is intended to be 
as non-committal as possible with respect to these options. Moreover, 
since the debitrtm issue arose historically in the context of a more "juridical" 
understanding of original sin than is often maintained today, it is reasonable 
that an attempt to dispose of it permanently should dispose of it even 
within the terms of that juridical understanding. 
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1.1.1. Law I says: 'You shall not eat of such-and-such a tree." 
Prescinding from mythological coloration of its content, some 
such injunction must be posited in harmony with the Catholic 
insistence that man's predicament as "fallen" results from an 
original, free choice of disobedience. The injunction is ana-
logous to social legislation. It is broken by Adam and Eve, 
and their punishment is expulsion from the Garden plus the 
unfavorably altered conditions of life corwected therewith. 
These new and unhappy conditions include (a) absence of 
original justice, (b) absence of the preternatural gifts, (c) sub-
jection to the Devil, (d) onerous labor; (e) concupiscence, etc. 
For convenience' sake, I shall refer to this collection of charac-
teristics henceforth as [a, b, c ... ]. Now, these characteristics 
play a double role. Considered vis-a-vis Adam's act, they are 
a punishment. Considered vis-a-vis God our End, they are 
a state-of-sin and incur the further punishment of eternal. ex-
clusion from the friendship of God. This double role is pos-
sible, of course, because of the peculiar character of the pri-
vation of grace.7 
The disobedience of the first parents did not take place, how-
ever, in a vacuum; it occurred within a unique, supernatural 
"situation" or "structure" (Adam's headship or corporate per-
sonality), which can be defined in part by a second "law." 
1.1.2. Law II says: "If Adam sins, both he and all those 
in solidarity with him will be characterized by [a, b, c ... ).8 
7 Within the order actually established by God, the absence of grace 
in man is never mere absence but always also privation. It is' in this 
light that the above-noted Janus-character of privatio gratiae is the ulti-
mate justification for the Church's constant praCtice of describing an 
ontologically negative state of affairs (absence of grace) in axiologically 
negative terms (peccat11m). · 
8 The term "solidarity" is ambiguous, because man's solidarity with 
Adam seems to be revealed with respect to two distinct points, namely: 
solidarity with. him as acting either to keep justice or to lose it, and 
solidarity with him as ancestor (seminal containment). It will be argued 
below, in harmony with what appears to be a consensus of theologians, 
that mere seminal containment in Adam, or descent from Adam, considered 
6
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Notice that this "law" is not at all analogous to sociaL legis-
lation. It is not the.law which Adam broke, because it is m;>t 
the sort of thing that anybody can "break." . It is analogQ'!lS 
to a law of nature in that- it states what will universally occur 
under certain conditions. The coming-into-operation of Law. II 
is therefore in consequence of Adam's sin but not precisely 
punishment for it. The characteristics [a, b, c ... ] are the pun-
ishment. In other words, if Law II comes into operation, I 
am born with these characteristics. Because these characteris-
tics are ghastly, their existence in me can be called both "sin" 
and "punishment.~' · It is not unjust that I receive these ch.ar-
acteristics, because, thanks to his moral headship of the race, 
I was "in" Adam and died "in" him, when he broke Law I 
within the structure of Law II. Hence it is fitting that he and 
I receive the same penalty, which is the bearing of the same 
guilt. In any case, from the point of view of Adam's desc~d­
ants, the "punishment" which follows upon Adam's sin is these 
~haracteristics as actually received in his descendants-and not 
the coming-into-operation of Law II. Now, given that one' is 
to receive these characteristics, the question remains how one 
is to do so. Forth~ answer, one needs another law. 
purely as a biological relation, is not a sufficient condition for the con-
traction of original sin, although it is a necessary condition. Moreover, in 
recent polygenic theories, while· it is denied that there was an original 
pair from which all the preseqt human population is biologically descended, 
nevertheless it is usually affirmed that the present population is descended 
from some original group which either (a) sinned collectively, or (b) stood 
in special relation of corporate solidarity with the physical person ("Adam") 
who did sin. On the latter hypothesis, a child born today will have the 
same corporate solidarity with Adam but will not necessarily have a bio-
logical descent from him.· Whether such hypotheses are acceptable in 
Catholic theology is not at issue in" this paper, and no reliance will be 
placed upon them. Rather; it will be assumed here that it is theologically 
correct to say that all men are "biologically descended" from Adam. 
Nevertheless, the existence of such hypotheses does provide an additional 
motive for the darificatory convention which has been adhered to. through-
out this essay: . the term "descent" and its cognates are used exclusively 
to signify a biological· relation of ancestry, while the term "solidarity" is 
used solely to signify the moral or corporate or mystical bond .. 
7
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1.1.3. Law III says: "If human parents are characterized by 
[a, b, ·c ... ], then by natural generation their children who, are 
in solidarity with Adam will have [a; b, c ... ].9 
1.1.4. Now, if these distinctions are kept in mind, it becomes 
clear that the term "original sin" is an ambiguous one. It 
can mean: 
( 1) what Adam did, 
(2) the consequeil.~e. of what Ada~ did, t.e., the operation 
of Law II, 
. (3) the consequence of that consequence, i.e., the charac-
teristics [a, b, c ... ] as received in those having solidarity with 
Adam, or even · , 
( 4) the operation of Law III upon the human race. 
9 The expression "natural generation" is, of course, ambiguous. A com-
mon theological opinion excludes from "natural generation" any con-
ception in which male and female gametes do not fuse according to the 
usual course of nature. (Hence the virginal conception of Jesus would 
b~ exempt from Law III.) But this view has awkward consequences, to 
say the least. It is now reasonably certain that a human being can be 
produced by cloning; some biologists think that· even a natural partheno-
genesis is possible. Other biologists would argue that in the case of ident-
ical twins (or triplets, etc.), where a single fertilizatum has divided in the 
first days to produce two or more distinct embryos, what has rel!-llY oc-
curred is an atypical form of reproduction, so that the adult parents are 
really the grandparents of the twins. All these cases would ·give· rise to 
persons exempt from Law III, hence devoid of original sin, according to 
this view. Therefore, it seems better to define "natural generation" in a 
way broad enough to cover all such cases as are not supernatural q11oad 
mbstantiam. We may state the matter this way: the finality of ·~natural" 
generation is not simply the communication of human nature but also 
its communication to a human person. Thus a "supernatural generation" 
quoad substantiam could only arise if the Person receiving the human nature 
were not a human person-as when the Logos was conceived in His 
human nature. Such ·a case could preserve the descent from Adam but 
·not the substantial naturality of the generation itself. By contrast, a 
modally: supernatural generation, such as the' miraculous conception of 
Isaac or Samuel, would preserve both ·the descent from Adam and the 
substantial naturality of the human generation.· On this ·View, the term 
"natural" as used in the phrase "natural generation," will contrast with 
"supernatural," but not with "artificial." · •· · . ., _.,. : 
8
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1.1.5. Fortunately, the phrase "to contract original sin" is 
not ambiguous· at all. It clearly means: "to have solidarity 
with Adam in what he did and hence, by Law II and III, to 
receive the characteristics [a, b, c ... ]. " 
1.1.6. Alas, it is not so clear what one should make· of the 
phrase, "to have to contract original sin." If we attribute to 
Our Lady a debitum peccati, do we mean: 
( 1) that she was (or should have been) in solidarity with 
Adam in what he did? 
( 2) that she was (or should have been) subject to the op-
eration of Law II? 
(3) that she was (or should have been )subject to the op-
eration of Law III? 
We shall have to consider these possibilities separately. We 
shall proceed in the order stated. 
1.2.0. Can it be said that Our Lady was in solidarity with 
Adam in what he did? 
This question would have been formulated by many older 
theologians in a more vivid way. They would have asked 
"whether the Blessed Virgin sinned in Adam," and I, too, 
shall use this form of words in the following exposition, simply 
because it is less cumbersome. In using the more vivid formula, 
I do not wish to be understood as endorsing the questionable 
theory which holds that, because our wills were transferred to 
Adam and hence were committed with his will in his sinful 
act, we can be said to have "sinned" in Adam in some meta-
physically literal sense.10 It suffices for present purposes that 
· 
10 Theological usage of the phrase "to sin in Adam" undoubtedly 
stemmed from a dubious interpretation of Rom. 5:12. Today exegetes 
are generally agreed that Jerome's version, in q11o [Adam} omnes peccave-
mnt should have been rendered as eo q11od omnes peccaverrmt. Neverthe-
less, parallel Biblical data fully legitimize the expression that all "died" 
in Adam. These parallel data seem to provide the proper understanding 
of Trent's own usage of Rom. 5:12, namely, that the peccat11m transmitted 
to us is not the act but the state-of-sin or mors animae. 
9
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our solidarity with Adam (whether juridical or mystical, neither 
or both) be conceived in such a way that we really bear the 
moral effect of his act (the resultant state-of-sin) just as much 
as he did. In other words, I assume only the common teaching 
that the act of sinning is to the state of sin as cause is to effect. 
The state of sin (privation of grace) is not a physical effect 
of the culpable act, of course, but its moral effect. The moral 
causality of the act consists simply in this: if x sins, then God, 
in view of the act, ceases to conserve in being the grace of x. 
On this interpretation, to ask "whether x sinned in Adam" 
will not presuppose that x somehow acted in Adam, nor that 
Adam's act as such can be imputed to x; it will simply be to 
ask whether God ceased to conserve in being (or. foresaw that 
He would not conserve in being) the grace of x in view of x's 
solidarity with Adam. 
The question at hand, then, is whether the answer to this 
question is affirmative, when one substitutes "Mary" for 11X." 
1.2.1. The correct way to answer this question is to explore 
the interrelations of four open sentences. One wishes to know 
whether these four sentences are equivalent, that is, whether 
they are satisfied by exactly the same set of arguments and hence 
have the same extension. The four open sentences are the 
following (the verbs are to be taken as tenseless) : 
(a) x is descended from Adam; 
(b) x contracts original sin; 
(c) xis in Adam as moral head of the race; 
(d) x sins in Adam. 
1.2.2. One can say of any human being, begotten in any way 
from the existing human stock, that he or she is descended 
from Adam, hence was "seminally contained" in him. Thus 
the extension of (a) includes Our Lord as well as Our Lady. 
1.2.3. But one cannot say of all human beings that they con-
tract original sin, for at least Our Lord and Our Lady have not. 
Hence the extension of (b) is not identical to that of (a) . 
1.2.4. The difficulty is to decide which persons were in Adam 
10
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as moral head of the .i:ace: -It is obvious that everyone who 
sinned · iO. ·Adam was "in" him as head. But one may ask 
whether everyone who was in Adam as head also sinned in 
him.11 Beyond doubt, this question must be answered in the 
affirmative; for a negative answer would falsify the in quo 
omnes peccavemnt of Romans 5:12, as interpreted by Trent. 
The reason for this is the fact that our "solidarity" with Adam, 
insofar as it means anything more than the biological relation 
of descent (see above, note 8), is revealed and definable solely 
with respect to a single point, kil., our solidarity with him 
as acting either to keep justice or to lose it. Hence to suggest 
that someone might have been "in Adam" morally or mystically 
without having also died in Adam through his sin is to speculate 
in thin air. Therefore, the extensions of (c) and (d) are 
identical. · 
1.2.5. Next, one may ask whether everyone who sinned in 
Adam has contracted (or will contract) original sin. Again, 
the answer must be affirmative. For what can it mean to say, 
of a person who never contracted original sin, that he or she 
nevertheless sinned in Adam? If Mary, for example, does not 
bear in herself the full set of characteristics [a, b, c ... ), then 
what reality in her corresponds to this alleged property of 
having sinned in Adam? If one admits, in harmony with the 
obvious tenor of the Ineffabilis Deus, that no reality in her cor-
responds to sin, then to say that she sinned in Adam is to say 
that she sinned but has. no sin-which is contradictory. Fur-
thermore, the Council of Trent makes it clear that the charac-
teristics [a, b, c ... ), as actually received in us, are, or include, 
a real peccatum (D.S., 1512), which is identified with the 
mors animae. This peccatum will have to be understood either 
as the act-of-sin, which would have to be a free operation (if 
not free in us, then ·free in Adam) or else as the state-of-sin 
11 Cf. the intervention.of Karl Strater, S.]., in the public debate over 
the debit11m during the International Mariological Congress in Rome 
· (1954), in Virgo Immacrtlata 11 (1957) 490-491. 
11
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which resl1lts from such an act (if not from our own act, then 
from Adam's) . But if the free· act causative of the sin-state is 
not in us (as it is not), it can only be found in him with whom 
we are in solidarity. Hence, on either hypothesis, the charac-
teristics received in us are precisely peccatum if, and only if 
we sinned in Adam. Conversely, if anyone sinned in Adam, 
he or she really sinned. (It does not help to add the mitigating 
words 11radicaliter," 11virtualiter,'' 11extrinsece," and the like; 
after all, species non mutat genus.) Now, if the same person 
has committed no actual sin, then the real sin-act or sin-state 
in that person can only be the inherited one; namely, the char-
acteristics [a, b, c. . . ]. Hence a person sinned in Adam if and 
only if he has (or will have) the characteristics [a, b, c ... ] . 
Therefore, to have "sinned in Adarri" and to "contract original 
sin" are fully equivalent expressions. To deny either is neces-
sarily to deny the other. The extensions of (b), (c) and (d) 
are thus identical. Therefore, since it is certain that Our Lady 
did not contract original sin, it is also certain that she did not 
sin in Adam.12 
1.3.0. However, can it be said that she should have sinned 
in Adam? A defender of the debitum will have to say this, 
if he intends the debitum to have a strong sense. He might say 
l.2 Not a few of the older theologians (e.g., Suarez) did affirm that 
Mary had sinned in Adam. In more recent times, however, partly on 
the strength of arguments similar to those adduced above, there has been 
a definite trend away from so crude an expression, although some still 
use it. See the abundant bibliography compiled by ]. B. Carol, O.F.M., 
art. cit., in Marian St11dies 28 (1977) 181-256. 
It is important to note, however, that the real plausibility of the case 
for including Mary in Adam's moral headship does not lie in the grounds 
disposed of above, but in a more basic consideration, namely: Our Lady 
needed to be redeemed. Is it not the case that humanity, precisely insofar 
as it is in need of redemption, is humanity in solidarity with Adam? 
How, then, can Our Lady have needed redemption if she was not included 
in Adam, at least by right? This question is addressed below, section 
2.1.0ff. Father Carol informs us that he is writing a lengthy paper on 
this very question entitled, Reflections on the Problem of Mary's Preserv-
ative Redemption, which he hopes to publish in Marian St11dies, Vol. 30. 
12
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it on any of three grounds: 
( 1) Our Lady was "in" Adam as moral head of the race, 
hence debuit peccare in illo; 
( 2) Our Lady was descended from Adam, hence "should 
have been" in him as moral head of the race, and hence should 
have sinned in him. 
(3) Our Lady was a naturally begotten descendant of Adam, 
hence "should have been" in him as head, and hence should 
have sinned in him. 
1.3.1. Now the first of these grounds plainly cannot be true. 
We have already seen that everyone who was in Adam as moral 
head also sinned in him, otherwise the in quo omnes peccaver-
tmt is false; but we have also seen that Our Lady did not sin 
in Adam; therefore, she cannot have been in him as moral head 
of the race. 
1.3.2. The second ground is more modest. It argues that 
any descendant of Adam, by that fact alone, "ought to have 
been" subject to him as moral head, hence "ought to have" 
sinned in him, hence "ought to have" contracted the original 
sin. The trouble with this argument, as with any argument 
based on descendency alone, is that there is no way to stop it 
at Our Lady. Jesus Christ, too, was veritably son of David, 
son of Abraham, and son of Adam, as the genealogies of 
Matthew and Luke teach. Will anyone claim that He, too, had 
a debitum contrahendi peccatum? If not, this ground by itself 
is insufficient to sustain the conclusion.13 And if descendency 
will not suffice, the burden will have to be shifted to "nah1ral 
generation." 
1.3.3. Can it be held that Our Lady should have been in-
13 The opinion of St. Thomas (III Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, in c.) that 
"caro Christi secundum quod fuit in patribus, et etiam in ipsa Beata 
Virgine, peccato infecta frtit antequam assumeretur; sed in ipsa assump-
tione ab omni infectione peccati purgata est ... " has long been abandoned 
in Catholic theology. Cf. ]. M. Alonso, C.M.F., El debito del pecado 
original en Ia Virgen. Reftexiones criticas, in Revista Espanola de 
Teologfa 15 (1955) 72-73. 
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eluded in Adam's fall because of the way she was begotten? 
This argument, with its caro infecta or equivalent device, is a 
classic whose refutation may be more conveniently handled 
below (1.10.0), when we consider Our Lady's possible sub-
jection to Law Ill. 
1.3.4. Here it will suffice to show why mere descendency 
from Adam does not entail, of itself, that one was "in" Adam 
as moral head or sinned in him. It is usually classified as certa 
in theologia that natural generation is not the cause but only 
a condition sine qua non of the propagation of original sin.14 
Now descendency from Adam, considered purely in itself, is 
simply a relation to Adam as ancestor. It is a real relation, 
whose fundamentum in re is the generative power as reduced 
to act in Adam or in one of his offspring. Therefore, all that 
natural generation produces, of itself, is the child and the rela-
tion to Adam as ancestor. It does not produce the relation to 
Adam as head. This latter relation is verified only by the actual 
or foreseen receipt of Adam's sin, that is, the characteristics 
[a, b, c ... ]. After all, it is also considered certain in theology 
that the sin of Adam is the "causa unica" of original sin as 
propagated in his descendants.15 Now, if it is true that all who 
were "in" Adam as moral head did sin in him, and if "to sin in 
Adam" is really identical with "to contract original sin," then 
any person who does not contract original sin cannot have been 
really in solidarity with Adam as head. In Our Lady's case, it is 
most probable that she was related solely to the New Adam 
as head, because she was to be a member of the New Humanity 
from the first instant of her existence. This is not the case with 
the rest of us, who become members first of the Old,Man (by 
conception) and only subsequently of the New (by baptism). 
Hence the rest of us Christians have a relation to both heads 
of the race, but Mary to only one. This situation is intelligible 
14 See, for instance, ]. F. Sagiiez, S.J., De Deo creante et elevante, in 
Sacrae Theologiae S11mma (ed. 4, Matriti, 1964) II, 996ff. 
u Cf. Sagiiez, op. cit., 990. 
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so long as one bears in mind that the fundamentum in re for 
our relation to Adam as moral head is not simply biological 
descent but the actual or foreseen receipt in us of original sin.:16 
Absent this receipt (as in Our Lady's case), a person is related 
to Adam solely as ancestor. Thus the relation to Adam as an-
cestor and the relation to him as moral or mystical head are 
two distinct relations, having distinct fundamenta, even if 
the existence of the first relation is a necessary condition for 
the existence of the second. 
1.3.5. Thus, to resume, we have so far· two negative conclu-
sions: the debitum cannot mean that Our Lady either sinned 
in Adam or, simply qua descendant, should have sinned in him. 
We thus eliminate one version of the so-called debitum proxi-
mum. What remains? 
1.4.0. Well, one could shift the emphasis away from the diffi-
cult question of exactly how Our Lady is related to Adam as 
head. One could maintain that she, quite apart from that ques-
:te Undoubtedly, if one seeks to establish causal order, one must say 
that we receive the characteristics [a, b, c ... } because we are related 
to Adam as head, not vice-versa. Why, then, do I appear to argue the 
reverse, namely, that we are really related to Adam as head because we 
have or will have [a, b, c ... }? The order I have stated is the order of 
causae cognoscendi notiores quoad nos. We have no other basis than the 
actual contraction of sin for ascribing solidarity with Adam to a par-
ticular descendant of his. Therefore, I argue that in the ordo inventionis 
we have absolutely no basis for ascribing this solidarity to Mary. This 
contention does not alter the fact that, in the mystery of God's Providence, 
there is a true cause (notior in se) whereby such-and-such particular 
persons were foreseen in solidarity with Adam. 
Was Mary foreseen by God, in any way, as among these persons? On 
this question the debitum controversy often turns. It is sometimes said 
that Our Lady's receipt of sin was foreseen by God and decreed in His 
efficacious will that Adam be established in mystical solidarity with 
"many," and yet that her receipt of sin was never actualized by God, 
having been replaced by the contrary decree of the Immaculate Concep-
tion. This is the notorious problem of what order is to be assigned among 
the signa rationis. It will be discussed below, l.S.Off., when we con-
sider whether Mary could have been subject to Law II in principle but 
made an exception to it in fact. 
15
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tion, was nevertheless both Adam's descendant and born of sin-
ful parents; hence she was, by right, subject to the operation of 
some law of original sin's transmission. By far the most com-
mon understanding of the debitum peccati among theologians 
in recent times has been just this conception of the debitum 
as a "subjection" to a law similar (but not quite identical) to 
those formulated above. At the same time, the most common 
way to deny any debitum in Our Lady has been to deny that 
she was subject to those laws. This denial has almost always 
involved an appeal to the logical order of the divine, eternal 
decrees. Here a different, and perhaps more decisive, approach 
will be adopted. 
1.4.1. What does it mean to say that someone is "subject" 
to a law? 
1.4.2. The answer is fairly clear so long as the context is one 
of social legislation. In this sphere, I am "subject" to a law 
if, when I disobey it, some authority has the right to punish 
me. Thus to be subject to a law is to be a member of a par-
ticular class of persons, namely, those persons who are bound 
to obey a certain authority (e.g. the citizens of Italy) and whom 
that authority has justly bound with respect to the particular 
matter legislated upon. 
1.4.3. In the case of a moral law (even when the moral norm 
is not reflected in positive legislation), the situation is closely 
analogous. There is a legislator (God) and a promulgation 
(whether conscience or revelation). Abstractly, all men are 
at all times subject to the moral laws; but concretely, each man 
is subject to a particular moral law only insofar as he finds him-
self in the particular situation ( s) in which the performance 
or avoidance of a certain action is morally obligatory. For ex-
ample, to say (abstractly) that I am bound by the moral law 
against duelling means (concretely) that I must abstain from 
duelling if I am ever in the circumstances which would count 
as an instance of that offense. Thus, again, to be "subject" to 
the law is to belong to the class of persons who find themselves 
16
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in the particular circumstances within which the law applies. 
1.4.4. Both in the case of societal laws and in that of moral 
laws, one is subject to a law which one can break, although 
it is unjust to do so. Hence laws of both kinds are laws of 
which it is meaningful to say that one "ought to obey" them. 
Here there is an analogy with Law I} the law to which Adam 
was subject and which he broke. · 
1.4.5. The situation is· markedly different, however, if the 
context is one of nature and its law-like regularities. There is 
a physical formula, commonly known as the "law" of gravity, 
to which it is reasonable to say that I am "subject," since I 
belong to the class of bodies having mass. But no one will 
say that I am legally or morally "obliged" to keep this law 
(which I cannot break in any case), because its breach would 
not be a crime but a miracle. Now, it has been suggested above 
that the laws of original sin's transmission are more closely 
analogous to this sort of law than to social or moral laws. If 
this claim is true, it will be meaningless to speak of an "obliga-
tion" to obey them, and only nonsense will result from the 
attempt. 
1.4.6. Such nonsense, alas, is not hard to find in the litera-
ture on the debitum problem. Here is how it arises. 
One takes any revealed truth about who contracts original 
sin, why, or how. One observes that this fact is true by God's 
own ordinance, which is necessarily just. Then one says that 
a just ordinance "ought to be obeyed" by all those subject to 
it. Thus, by arguing from God's justice, one concludes to a 
proposition which predicates "ought to obey the ordinance" 
of all members of a certain class. And thus one obtains a ma-
jor which includes debet. Then the minor makes Mary a mem-
ber of this class, and it follows that she debuit oboedire. 
Against this debuit} the fact that she non oboedit is irrelevant. 
1.4.7. The trouble with this solution is its remarkable silli-
ness. It turns peccatum originate originatum into a benefit of 
"law and order." Mary was obliged to contract the sin, it 
17
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seems, because otherwise she would flout the house rules of the 
Oeconomia! But lest I be accused of answering this position 
with sarcasm alone, let me point out how it equivocates on 
legal obligation. Consider the panorama of a myriad genera-
tions of parents, tainted with original sin, dutifully begetting 
children having the same taint. By surprise, Joachim and Anne 
beget an immaculate child. A "law" has been broken. But 
who was responsible for keeping the law? Did Joachim and 
Anne "owe it" to God, or to their species, to beget a sinner? 
A fortiori: did the child "owe it" to her parents, or to God, 
to be a sinner? The question answers itself. After all, ex hy-
pothesi, God made the child immaculate. She didn't make her-
self. It is not as though Our Lady, declining to be a sinner, re-
sisted existence until, by sheer contrariness, she managed both 
to be and to be immaculate. Therefore, the "obligation" to 
obey, like the obligation to uphold this law rested squarely 
up<;>n God, not upon the child. The so-called debitum was His 
not hers.rr 
I think the collapse of this solution throws a new and deci-
sive light on a point which I have mentioned heretofore only 
in passing. 
1.4.8. The notion of "obligation to contract original sin" is 
neither revealed nor unambiguous. The debitum-defender must 
first define it, then prove that what he has defined attaches to 
Our Lady. As we hav~ just seen, the ordinary notions of legal 
and moral "obligation" make no sense in this context whatso-
ever. And the reason is not far to seek. Any argument to the 
effect that Mary was obliged to contract sin because she was 
obliged to obey a just ordinance equivocates in no less than 
three distinct ways. First, it treats a supernatural arrangement 
which is in many ways analogous to a regularity of nature as 
though it were analogous to just, social legislation. In this 
17 See a variation of this argument skilfully elaborated by ].-F. Bonnefoy, 
O.F.M., in Q11elqt~es theories modernes d11 'debit11m peccati,' in Ephemerides 
Mariologicae 4 (1954) 322-323. 
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way, an idea of "obligation" is introduced where it has no 
place. Secondly, having made this blunder, such an argument 
attaches the obligation to the wrong party. It makes no sense 
to daim that Mary, or even Mary's nature, was "obliged" to 
keep a law which neither she nor her nature could possibly 
transgress. Since only God could break the "law," the argu-
ment would prove God unjust, if it proved anything. Thirdly, 
such an argument strangely forgets that original sin is a punis-
ment. Original sin in tts is the receipt of the characteristics 
[a, b, c ... } as defined above. But the receipt of these charac-
teristics is the receipt of a punishment. Now, it makes sense 
to say that one is obliged to keep a law; it also makes sense to 
say that the lawmaker is obliged to enforce his law by punish-
ing offenders; but it makes no sense to say that one is obliged 
in justice to receive a punishment. For in that case, all par-
dons (and all redemptions!) would be unjust. Finally, if one 
wishes to say that the guilty party has some weaker, quasi-
moral obligation to welcome the punishment due for his of-
fense, one must first establish that Mary was a guilty party, 
i.e. that she sinned in Adam. But we have already seen that 
this is impossible. "To sin in Adam" and "to contract original 
sin" are always idem in re, though they differ ratione. Were 
this not so, that is, were it possible to call Mary a sinner-in-
Adam on some other basis than a contraction of original sin, 
then her non-contraction would leave her a sinner. She would 
be simul justa et peccatrix, and the Immaculate Conception 
would be Lutheranized in meaning-a case of extrinsic justi-
fication! 
1.4.9. Thus we have seen that the debitum alleged in Our 
Lady cannot mean legal or moral obligation to obey a just 
ordinance and hence cannot mean "subjection" to a law in 
this sense. What remains? · 
1.5.0. Well, if one strips away the notions of legal or moral 
duty, "subjection" to a law means only one thing: it means be-
longing to the set of objects upon which the law operates-that 
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is, the set of objects which fulfill those initial or boundary con-
ditions under which the law has predictive force. Hence Our 
Lady will have been "subject" to the laws of original sin's 
transmission, if and only if she was a member of the set of per-
sons tor whom Law II holds, or Law III, or both. Thus debet 
ceases to be a deontic operator and reduces to ordinary, nomo-
logical necessity. 
1.5.1. In this restricted sense, then, <:an it be said that Our 
Lady was "subject" to the operation of Law II? The reader 
will recall that Law II said: "if Adam sins, both he and all 
those in solidarity with him will be characterized by [a, b, 
c. ... ] " 
1.5.2. The answer is already clear from what has been said. 
The term "solidarity," as used in this formula, was defined 
above (note 8) as that mystical bond whereby we can be said 
to have died in Adam through his sin. Thus everyone having 
"solidarity" with Adam in this sense must be said (in an older 
terminology) to have sinned in Adam. But nothing of the 
kind can be said of Our Lady. Hence she is not a member of 
the class of persons subject to the operation of Law II. 
1.6.0. But can it be said that Our Lady "should" have been 
subject to the operation of Law II, that is, that Law II should 
have predicted the outcome in her case? The debitum-defender 
will have to make this claim, and he might do so on several 
grounds. Thus: 
( 1) Mary was a descendant of Adam, therefore she should 
have been in solidarity with him, hence subject to Law II. 
(2) Mary was naturally begotten by sinful parents, them-
selves descended from Adam and in solidarity with him; hence 
she should have been subject to Law II. 
( 3) Mary in fact was in solidarity with Adam, hence was 
subject to Law II in principle, although God made her an ex-
ception to it in fact. 
1.6.1. The first and second of these grounds are plainly 
absurd. They both amount to saying that because Mary ful-
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filled at least one necessary condition for the contraction of 
original sin, she ought to have fu]blled the sufficient condition 
also and hence contracted. This is to assert that every queen 
"ought" to be a harlot, because she fulfills at least two neces-
sary conditions for being a harlot, namely, she is a human being 
and a woman. 
1.6.2. Nevertheless, despite their absurdity, the first and sec-
ond of these grounds bring to light a powerful psychological 
basis for the debitum's plausibility. We are creatures of routine. 
We observe regularities and proceed by trial and error (or by 
theological reasoning) to formulate the laws which account 
for those regularities; and in doing so, we often mistake neces-
sary conditions for sufficient ones; then, when an event which 
our inadequate law-formula failed to predict shatters the ex-
pected routine, our first reaction is one of discomfort. We ai:e 
annoyed that our formula did not hold; and, despite the facts, 
we claim that the law "ought to have held." But this claim 
need not be a petulant exclamation. If we move from psycho-
logical considerations to epistemological ones, the statement, 
"This law ought to have held," can be taken as making two 
very different claims, depending on whether the referent of 
"this law" is the law-formula or the law-in-the-real. 
1.6.3. On the one hand, if "this law" refers to one of our 
formulas, then the claim is not only significant but highly 
important for the progress of science (even a science like the~ 
ology) . After all, it is vital to know which of our current 
formulas has been falsified by the new fact, so that we can 
know just whid1 of our formulas requires correction. If we 
could not make this claim about some one of our formulas, 
there would be no sure way to assimilate any new fact into 
the corpus of existing science, because there would be no way to 
correct that corpus methodically in the light of experience (or, 
for that matter, in the light of a new dogmatic definition) . 
Thus, taken in this sense, the claim, "This law ought to have 
held," does recognize a "debitum" but it attaches the debit11m 
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precisely to the formula; its force is to point out the gap be-
tween what we say (the formula) and what we need to ex-
plain; thus the effect of the debitum is to falsify the formula in 
question. 
1.6.4. On the other hand, if "this law" supposes for the or-
der which obtains in rerum natura, then the claim, "This law 
ought to have held," is patently self-contradictory. For, as a 
counterfactual, the claim presupposes that the real law did not 
hold; hence it presupposes that what obtains in reality does not 
obtain in reality. 
1.6.5. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that serious con-
fusion over the suppositio of "law" lies just beneath the sur-
face of many arguments in favor of the debitum peccati. Isn't 
it historically the case that such a debitum was "discovered" 
when the fact of the Immaculate Conception, no longer deni-
able, contradicted some cherished theological formula? And 
wasn't this debitum thereupon, without further ado, posited in 
the real, as though the formula had been the real law, which 
thus both obtained (hence the real debitum) and didn't obtain 
(hence the non-contraction) ? As soon as a real regularity or 
law is allowed both to obtain and not obtain, theology acquires 
all the well-known curiosities of the debitum debate: subjec-
tions which don't subject, obligations which don't oblige, ne-
cessities which don't necessitate. 
1.6.6. Consider the argument advanced by Fr. Armand Plessis, 
S.M.M.18 His major is that every normally begotten human 
necessarily contracts original sin. The minor is that Mary is 
a normally begotten human being. He concludes that Mary 
was, therefore, "under a necessity" to contract-which "neces-
sity" is her debitum. But this conclusion has nothing to do 
with the premises. If it is true that every member of the class 
of "normally begotten humans" necessarily contracts original 
18 A. Plessis, S.M.M., Man11el de Mariologie Dogmatiqtte (Montfort-
sur-Meu, 1947) 62. 
22
Marian Studies, Vol. 29 [1978], Art. 12
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/marian_studies/vol29/iss1/12
156 A Logician's Reflections on the Debitum 
sin, it follows either that Mary is not a member of this class 
(which Plessis denies) or else that Mary actually contracts the 
sin (which he also denies). Hence his position is simply in-
consistent. But the inconsistency is disguised by a number of 
suppressed premises. The real structure of an argument of this 
kind is the following: 
(1) The conclusion of a sound syllogism ought to hold; 
(2) the following is a sound syllogism: (here, the debitum-
defender may insert a syllogism he likes, for example:) 
(a) children of parents stained with original sin are 
begotten in the same state, 
(b) Mary is a child of parents stained by original sin, 
(c) Therefore, Mary is begotten in the state of orig-
inal sin. 
(3) Therefore, (c) ought to hold even though,- de facto. 
it doesn't; 
- ( 4) and this "ought to" is the debitum peccati. _ 
1.6.7. Frankly, this reasoning can only be called preposterous. 
In any logic I know, if the conclusion of a syllogism is false 
in fact, there is something wrong with the premises. That much 
is elementary. In the present case, it is clear that the major 
(a) is faulty because it states a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition for contraction. But as soon as one amends the major 
to read correctly ( c£. Law II), it is dear that the minor (b), 
as stated, is insufficient to yield a conclusion. Hence the basis 
for the debitum vanishes. 
1.7.0. I think it is time for a brief pause to gather together 
the threads of what has been proved so far. First of all, there 
are three gound-rules which any attempt to deduce the debitum 
must respect. They are: 
( 1) Our Lady's debitum must emerge as a theological con-
clusion, hence follow as a bona consequentia from premises 
at least one of which is revealed. 
(2) The precise notion of a debt or "obligation to contract" 
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original sin is not revealed, hence cannot be presupposed in the 
proof but must itself emerge as a bona consequentia from 
revealed data. 
(3) It is excluded that Our Lady deserved original sin on 
the ground that she sinned in Adam or was duty-bound to obey 
a just ordinance. 
1.7.1. Now, I submit that these ground-rules make any plaus-
ible, theological proof for the debitum impossible to construct. 
The reason is simple. So long as rule (3) is obeyed, the obli-
gation in question can only be conceived as Our Lady's belong-
ing to a class which regularly contracts original sin. Two such 
classes would be "descendants of Adam" and "offspring of 
parents themselves having original sin." The reader is free to 
think of others. However, whenever one makes the major of the 
syllogism read,"all members of this class contract original sin," 
and the minor, "Mary is a member of this class," the syllogism 
is eo ipso false because Mary's belonging to the class falsifies 
the major. But as soon as one amends the major to read, "all 
members of this class ought to contract original sin," one as-
sumes what needs to be proved. Finally, if one adopts the 
desperate measure of adding a proviso to the major, so that it 
reads, "all members of this class contract original sin unless 
God intervenes," no conclusion follows at all. The major, 
whrch is the "law," loses all deductive power. How, then, is 
the "ought" or the "obligation" ever to get into the proof, with-
out being smuggled in as above, metalinguistically, in the ab-
surd daim that a bad syllogism "ought to hold" even when it 
doesn't? 
. 1.7.2. After all, there is hardly a more familiar mistake than 
false generalization based on inadequate induction. Indeed, 
theology offers an instructive parallel. Prior to the revelation of 
the virginal conception of Jesus, a logician would have noted 
the universal conjunction of being-a-virgin with not-being-a-
mother. If 'a', 'b', 'c', etc., are distinct particular women, our 
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logician (had he been acquainted with modern symbolic con-
ventions) would truly have written: 
( 1) 'a is a virgin &-(a is a mother),' 'b is a virgin &-
( b is a mother),' etc., 
for every known particular (where '-' is negation) . The facts 
would have seemed to justify turning the conjunction into a 
strict implication: · 
( 2) 'a is a virgin >-(a is a mother) ', etc., 
where '>' is strict implication. The same facts would have 
seemed to justify replacing the individual constants with a 
bound variable in universal quantification (anybody, every-
body). The result would have been: 
(3) Vx (xis a virgin > -(xis a mother)), 
where 'V' is the universal quantifier ("all"). There at last is 
the general "law" which applies to all cases, abstracting from 
individuals (a, b, etc) without prescinding from them. Hence 
from (3) as a premise, (2) is correctly deducible. But now 
let 'a' have as its referent the Virgin Mary. Then from (3) it 
follows necessarily that 
( 4) The Virgin Mary is not a mother. 
Alas, de facto she is a mother. But shall our logician say that 
she was "under a necessity" not to be a mother? Unwilling to 
alter his original induction and stubbornly committed to ( 3), 
shall he posit a debitum non_-maternitatis? If so, he resembles 
the defenders of a certain other debitum and falls under the 
stricture of the beautiful Akathist Hymn: 
Rhetoric's many followers were mute as fish when they saw thee, 
0 Mother of God; for t!:hey dared not ask: How canst thou bear a 
child and yet remain a virgin? But we marvel at this mystery, and 
with faith cry: 
Hail, Vessel of the wisdom of God; ha:il, .treasury of His fore-
knowledge. 
Hail, thou that showest philosophers fools; ha:il, thou that 
provest logicians illogical. 
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The point is that, from a logical point of view, there is no 
formal difference between the fallacious step by which 
(3) Vx (xis a virgin>-(x is a mother ) ) 
is reached and the fallacious step by which 
(5) Vx (xis a naturally begotten descendant of sinful Adam 
> x contracts original sin) 
is reached. In both cases, the step to a bound variable in uni-
versal quantification is falsified by fact and by the same person. 
And in both cases, a "debitist" position arises from refusing to 
admit the logical consequence of the factual falsification-
namely, the falsehood of ( 3) and ( 5) as they stand. There 
can be little doubt that the reason why this formal parallel 
has not been faced historically is the material difference that, 
whereas the falsification of (3) could be taken as an ordinary 
case of a miracle "breaking" a law of the merely natural order, 
the falsification of ( 5) could be taken as a supernatural "ex-
ception" to a supernaturallaw.19 
1.8.0. The force of these considerations will emerge more 
clearly, and in a new light, if we return now to consider the 
19 In reality, of course, this material difference is neither here nor there. 
For in both cases one must revise theory in the light of falsifications, and 
in both cases the revision faces two basic methodological options: either 
to abandon the law totally, or else to supplement it, in effect, by positing 
more restrictive boundary conditions. In the case of (3) and other mirac-
ulous occurrences, Catholic philosophers have usually (and wisely) pre-
ferred the latter course: the law remains but is supplemented by a re-
striction limiting its validity to objects subjected exclusively to natural cau-
salities. Then objects subjected to divine causality lie outside its boundaries. 
In the case of (5), one could proceed in just the same way: keep the law 
but supplement it with a restriction to the supernatural order. Then an 
object subject to causalities of the hypostatic order will lie outside its 
boundaries. (Then Mary has no debitum save, perhaps, that of being 
filled with grace.) In the present essay, however, the author has taken 
the alternative option of arguing that (5) is simply false in that it mis-
takes a necessary condition for a sufficient one. There are no other 
methodologically coherent options, and the debitum peccati disappears 
under either coherent one. These points will be developed somewhat more 
fully in the next few sections. 
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third ground, mentioned above in 1.6.0., for saying that Our 
Lady "should" have been subject to Law II. The third ground 
was this: Mary really was in solidarity with Adam, hence really 
did fulfill the sufficient condition for contracting sin; therefore 
she was subject to Law II in principle, although God made her 
an exception to it in fact.20 
1.8.1. This approach raises again the question of -what we are 
to mean by a "law" in this context. Because Law II is not the' 
sort of law which those subject to it can break, it was suggested 
above that this "law" is analogous to a regularity of nature. It 
is somewhat similar to the law of gravity. But such laws do not 
admit of exceptions. If, for example, the desk before me should 
suddenly begin to levitate in apparent defiance of the law of 
gravity, one would have to say, after duly establishing the fact, 
one (and only one) of two things. (a) First, one might say that 
the "exception" is evidence of some hitherto undiscovered but 
natural restriction on the operation of the law; and in that 
case, the result would have to be a reformulation of the law 
and its boundary-conditions. Thus the so-called exception 
would not be an exception to the true law, correctly formulated, 
but an instance of it. In Mary's case, her non-contraction of 
[a, b, c. . . ], would prove either that the formula of Law II 
should never have been applied to _her case, or else that the 
formula was incorrect. Thus the Immaculate Conception would 
20 Be it noted that the term "exception" can be taken in two ways. 
In one way, the 'exception' simply means the 'unusual.' If among a mil-
lion blacks, one fellow is an albino, he is certainly an exception. But 
he has no debitrtm negritrtdinis. So, in the sense of what is uncommon, 
unusual, odd, rare, or unique, one can certainly say that the Blessed Virgin 
is an exception-without thereby implying any debitum. And in the same 
sense, to say that God made her an exception is simply to say that God 
made her what she is-unique. 
In a second sense, however, the 'exception' is what is 'exempted from 
the rule.' In this sense, to 'make an exception' means not merely to make 
an unusual result, but to break a rule in order to get the result (whether 
or not the result is particularly unusual). When used by the debitum-
defender, of course, the term "exception" always has this second sense. 
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either invalidate Law II as here stated or else prove that Mary 
was not subject to it. Either way, the debitum vanishes. (b) 
Alternatively, one might say that the breach of the law was 
not due to any natural agency but was supernaturally caused. 
If so, the levitation of my desk is a miracle and has nothing to 
do with the law of gravity in its correct formulation. For no 
one suggests that the laws of physics ought to be formulated 
so as to account for and predict causalties which transcend 
their boundary conditions, that is, transcend the natural order. 
But Law II is supposed to predict a regularity of the super-
natural order. Hence to posit the Immaculate Conception as a 
supernatural "exception" to it is, once again, to invalidate the 
law, as formulated, within its own order.21 Thereupon the 
question arises as to how Law II could be reformulated so as 
to read correctly. And to this question, there is only one an-
swer: one would have to add a proviso, such as "unless God in-
tervenes." But the addition of such a proviso, however worded, 
has a devastating effect upon the whole pro-debitum argument, 
as has already been noted. For it results in a "law" from which 
nothing relevant can be deduced. 
1.8.2. At this point the debitum-defender might raise an ap-
parently serious objection. Granted that a formula like Law II 
is in some ways analogous to a law of nature, nevertheless in 
other important ways, it is not. For example, it does not op-
erate by blind physical necessity. As a product of God's wisdom, 
it is subject to His will. Thus, just as a human law-giver can 
act personally to make intelligent exceptions to his laws, with-
out thereby invalidating them, so also God can make an ex-
ception in the case of Our Lady. Indeed, the debitum only 
means that He did have to make an exception. 
21 Will anyone argue that the law of the supernatural order (Law II) 
was supervened in Mary's case by. a Law of the hypostatic order? If 
so, of course, her real subjection was to the higher law. Thus the 
debitt~m peccati would vanish, to be replaced by a debitrtm gratiae. Cf. 
Marian Stttdies 28 (1977) 185, n. 11 with the reference to St. Pius X's 
encyclical Ad diem illttm (Acta Sanctae Sed is 36 [1904} 456). 
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The correct way to answer this objection is to accept the first 
part of it and reject the second. 
1.8.3. As to the first part, it is absolutely true that original 
sin's transmission is a mysterious arrangement which is only 
imperfectly illuminated by the analogy of "law." And this im-
perfection remains whether one takes the laws of parliament 
or the laws of physics as the prime analogate. But here the 
debitum-defender must be on his guard. It is his case, not mine, 
which requires the legal analogy, because it is his contention, 
not mine, that Mary was "subject to a law" by virtue of whose 
operation all those subject to it contract original sin. Now, just 
because the debitum-defender must rely on the legal analogy, 
even while recognizing that it is only an analogy, it is his duty 
to beware of the equivocity of the term "law" in human usage. 
He must decide which sort of law supports the analogy; and 
having made his choice, he must adhere to it. He must not 
shift back and forth, from sort to sort, as convenience in con-
troversy dictates. 
1.8.4. Now, as to the second part of the objection we are 
considering, the debitum-defender has seen the awkwardness 
of analogizing from the laws of physics, namely, that this anal-
ogy deprives him of the useful term "exception." · For, as we 
have seen, to say that an event was an "exception" to a law-
formula is only to posit a relation of reason between a failed 
formula and the event it failed to predict, while the real law, 
is, by definition, the law which does not fail, hence has no "ex-
ceptions." Therefore the debitum-defender now proposes that 
Law II may be analogous to social legislation after all, because 
it may admit of exceptions in the hands of an all-wise Adminis-
trator. Will this new analogy survive inspection? 
1.8.5. I think not. Why, after all, does a human legislator 
make unwritten "exceptions" to his laws? He does so because 
he cannot, when promulgating the law, foresee all the unusual 
cases which may arise and which may tum the observance of the 
law into a hardship which he did not intend to impose. Hence, 
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one reason for the exceptions is a defect in the original under-
standing of the consequences of the law; and the other reason 
for exceptions consists in the tacit qualifications which the legis-
lator implicitly intended but did not think to write down in the 
law itself (and could not have written down without making 
the law too complex to be humanly manageable). Therefore, 
in the human analogate there is a temporally prior promulga-
tion, accompanied by imperfect understandings and unformu-
lated qualifications, all of which form the necessary "back-
ground" against which the unforeseen case can figure as an 
"exception." But in God there is neither time, nor defect of 
understanding, nor unformulated intention. The case to which 
the law will not be applied is foreseen just as clearly and just 
as eternally as the law itself. Therefore, if the analogy is to 
survive, the "promulgation" of Law II as covering Mary's case 
must enjoy a purely logical priority in God over His decree of 
the Immaculate Conception. Hence the historical appeal to the 
signa rationis. 
1.9.0. That this appeal, generally the last resort of the pro-
debitum position, necessarily fails on Thomistic principles may 
be shown by a short argument conducted entirely on those prin-
Ciples. For a Thomist, the crucial issue is not the order of pri-
ority and posteriority among the signa, as is often supposed; in 
fact this order is crucial only for a Scotist. Rather, for a 
Thomist, the crucial issue is what is required for a will to be 
efficacious. Let us see why this is so. 
1.9.1. At the outset, it must be admitted that Our Lady's 
being foreseen in solidarity with Adam (that is, as a member 
of the class of persons for whom Adam is mystical head and 
sign) amounts to a subjection to Law II and hence amounts 
to a debitum, if and only if she is thus attained by God in an 
efficacious will. For it is only in an efficacious will that Law II 
is "in force," hence is a law, hence has subjects. Therefore, if 
there is to be a debitum, Our Lady must be attained in an ef-
ficacious will precisely and simply as a member of the class in 
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solidarity with Adam, hence as subject to an efficaciously willed 
Law II. 
1.9.2. Now hear what John of St. Thomas says about effica-
cious wills (the translation is my own) : 
"Among the efficacious wills themselves, one should not dis-
tinguish the signa or priorities on the basis of those things 
which are necessarily presupposed for efficacity, as, for ex-
ample, that something be attained first under a common or 
abstract ratio, then under more concrete and individuated con-
ditions. For an efficacious will, qua efficacious, attains nothing 
under abstraction. And so it is not the case that, prior to the 
efficacious decree Of the Incarnation, there was already an In-
carnation willed in abstraction from passible vs. impassible 
flesh, from redemptive vs. non-redemptive role, etc. Rather, 
whenever an efficacious will is posited under any priority, its 
object has to be attained under that condition and disposition 
by which it looks to existing and in fact is, both under an in-
dividual condition and under those other conditions without 
which, in itself, it cannot be determinately conceived, so as to 
be posited in fact. For efficacity essentially deals with and 
looks to esse, and does not prescind from it, and hence looks 
to individuation. Therefore the priorities in efficacious decrees 
have to be assigned according to the different orders of de-
pendencies or causalities, according to which one thing ( logi-
cally) precedes and is called "prior to" another de facto and 
in itself-not according to priorities of abstraction and contrac-
tion, which rather serve to remove the thing from the order of 
efficacity. "22 
1.9.3. Obviously, this rule for ordering the signa was formu-
lated by John of St. Thomas in response to the Scotist challenge. 
The rule is designed to eliminate the Scotist way of assigning 
an absolute priority to the Incarnation without exhaustively de-
2 2 John of St. Thomas, Crmm Theol., disp. 25, nn. 48 and 49; ed. 
Solemnes, III, 158-159. 
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termining the "Incarnation" thus priorized. At issue here is the 
fundamental difference between the two metaphysics. If "for-
malities" are actually distinct ex parte rei, then real beings can 
be constituted by a series of efficacious decrees which add for-
mality to formality, down to the last haecceitas. But if the 
"formalities" are only rationes of what is simply itself in re, 
and if they become distinct only by a distinctio rationis ratio-
cinatae, then no such series of efficacious decrees is possible; 
the series must be reduced to a single decree which, qua effica-
cious, can attain only a fully determinate object. 
Therefore, obviously, on Thomistic principles there can be 
no efficacious will of God which attains Mary simply, and 
solely, "under the title" of solidarity with Adam. For, as at-
tained under this. title, she is merely an instance of a class, 
that is, someone attained under a common or abstract ratio. 
1.9.4. Objicies: Being in solidarity with Adam formally in-
cludes the ratio of being a subsistent in human nature. But 
to be "subsistent" is to be fully terminated in the line of sub-
stance and hence in immediate disposition to existence. There-
fore Mary, even as attained solely under the title of solidarity 
with Adam, is sufficiently individualized to be the object of 
an efficacious decree. 
1.9.5. Distinguo majorem: that solidarity with Adam, ut 
concepta, includes or presupposes subsistence in signified act, 
concedo; includes the concreteness necessary for efficacity, 
nego. Et nego consequens. The concept of an incarnate Logos, 
simply as such, also includes the concept of a subsistent in 
human nature. But in order to have real determination, it re-
mains to specify every property which the thing must either 
have or not have in its first moment of existence, in order to 
exist at all. Hence, if the merely signified subsistence included 
in the concept of an Incarnation which abstracts from passible 
vs. impassible flesh, etc., does not suffice for individuation-
as John of St. Thomas insists it does not-neither does the 
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signified subsistence of a Mary conceived in abstraction from 
the privileges. 
1.9.6. lnstas: It is permitted, however, to assign an order 
of priority among efficacious wills on the basis of any causal 
order,. or order of real dependency, of one thing upon another. 
But the supernatural presupposes and depends upon the nat-
ural. (And the reverse is also sometimes true, as John of St. 
Thomas remarks elsewhere in the section excerpted.) Hence 
there can and must have been an efficacious decree determining 
Mary to exist as a human being, in this flesh and these bones, 
begotten at this time from these parents, etc., prior to the ef-
ficacious decree determining her supernatural privileges. Atqui, 
to receive the nature by natural generation from parents living 
post lapsum Adae entails receipt of the nature as tainted from 
Adam. Ergo, there can and must have been an efficacious de-
cree establishing Mary's subjection to original sin prior to the 
efficacious decree exempting her therefrom. 
1.9.7. Respondeo I: Nego minorem: to descend from Adam 
by natural generation is a necessary condition for contracting 
the sin but not the sufficient condition. Therefore, the prior 
efficacious decree determining Mary's existence in the natural 
order is neither per se nor per accidens a decree subjecting her 
to Law II. Let us be clear about this: the decree determining 
whatever is necessary to Mary's concrete existence in the natural 
order, even if it is logically prior to the decree determining her 
privileges, does not establish a debitum contrahendi peccatum, 
unless one also assumes the caro infecta theory or some similar 
theory which makes descent from sinful Adam by natural gen-
eration the sufficient condition for contraction. Absent this ad-
ditional assumption, the order of decrees proves nothing. We 
shall discuss below the tenability of the caro infecta and sim-
ilar devices. Here it will suffice to conclude with an alternative 
response. 
1.9.8. Respondeo II: Nego majorem: Of all the worlds God 
could have created, He chose to create one in which man is 
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ordained to grace. Therefore, no efficacious will determining 
any man to exist within this chosen world can determine him 
to exist according to nature alone, abstracting from graced vs. 
non-graced. Therefore, every efficacious divine will determining 
a man to exist within this chosen world must determine him 
to exist, in the first ·instant of his existence, either with grace 
or else without it; and if his existence is to begin post lapsum 
Adae, then the absence of grace is already privation of grace 
in solidarity with Adam. There simply is no state called "sub-
jection to sin" in which an efficacious decree could posit a hu-
man being, intermediate between contracting sin and having 
grace. If this is admitted, then let us for the sake of argument 
also admit the minor which the debitum-defender alleges. Let 
us admit, in other words, that descent from an Adam-who-had-
sinned, by natural generation, suffices per se for that absence 
of grace which is the contraction of sin. We now face the 
following situation: there is a (logically) first efficacious de-
cree in God which determines Mary to exist in human nature 
in the first instant without grace, hence in original sin (not 
just subject to it, but in it) ; and there is a second efficacious 
decree in God which determines Mary to exist in the same hu-
man nature and in the same first instant with grace. Patet 
contradictio. 
1.9.9. Observe that there is no way to remove the contradic-
tion without also removing the debitum. For example, one can-
not make the first-willed sin a property of the nature, and the 
second-willed grace a property of the person, because efficacious 
wills don't posit mere natures, and because mere natures neither 
have nor contract sin.23 Of course, one could remove the con-
23 Hence, a correct understanding of efficacious volition is fatal to. the 
so-called debitum remotrtm, if the latter is supposed to attach not to the 
person but to the nature. For outside efficacious decrees there are no 
debita; and inside such decrees there are no mere natures. 
· Moreover, a theory of the debitum remotttm faces insoluble logical 
problems. Is the debitum a property of the nature as such? But no 
property of a nature qtta nature can be attributed to the bearer of the 
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tradiction by making one or the other will a voluntas simplex 
or antecedens. But which will is to be removed from efficacity? 
Not the second, s~rely, because the Immaculate Conception ac-
tually occurred. Then the first. But if the first will is non-ef-
ficacious, it involves no law as actually in force, or at least no 
efficacious subjection to it, hence no mandated contraction, 
hence no debitum. The only way to keep both decrees effica-
cious, and yet avoid contradiction, is to imagine that the law 
involved in the first decree included an explicit proviso allowing 
for non-contraction (perhaps whenever God willed, or perhaps 
only when the "subject" was to be the Mother of God). But 
on that assumption Mary is both subject to the law and by that 
fact alone not obliged to contract. Hence, no debitum. 
1.9.10. In summary, the attempt to argue from an analogy 
which would permit Law II to be the sort of law which ad-
mits of "exceptions" fails under the unique conditions which 
must be posited in God. Therefore, there is no ground fot 
saying that Mary either was or should have been subject to 
Law II. 
1.10.0. Can it be said that Our Lady was (or should have 
been) subject to Law III? The reader will recall that the term 
"natural generation" was defined above (note 9) in a way 
broad enough to cover every form of reproduction which pre-
serves descent from Adam, except the case of a generation 
which even though preserving descent from Adam, would be 
nature. For such a move would be formally equivalent to the following 
obviously false syllogism; Man is a species; Socrates is a man; therefore 
Socrates is a species. Hence, on this interpretation, it will be impossible 
to say, "Mary [or any other particular person] has a debit11m remotttm." 
In modern parlance, such an assertion will be a category mistake; in 
Scholastic parlance, a confusion in mppositio. 
If it is objected that the debitttm remotrtm is not in this sense a "property" 
of the nature but is rather an aspect predicable along with the nature, 
it will follow that "man" is never predicable of any individual unless 
"debet contrahere'1 is predicable along with it. In that case, the debitum 
remotum really becomes a debitum personate; worse, it follows that either 
Christ is not true man or else He, too, has a debitum. · 
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supernatural quoad substantiam. Thus Mary's mode of being 
begotten falls within the definition of "natural generation." 
1.10.1. However, it has also been argued that this natural 
generation from Adam is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for the contraction of original sin. Therefore Law III, 
as here formulated, includes the additional requirement that 
the children thus naturally generated be in "solidarity" with 
Adam, that is, that they be subjects of the mystical relation 
to Adam as moral head, whereby their own grace stands or 
falls with Adam's. Now, since it has been shown that Mary 
is not a subject of this mystical relation, it follows that she is 
not subject to Law III as here formulated. 
1.10.2. Nevertheless, the debitum-defender may well· ask 
whether the law-formulas adopted here do not "eliminate" 
the debitum peccati only by the rough and arbitrary procedure 
of defining it away. Is it really legitimate, he may ask, to dis-
tinguish our mystical solidarity with Adam from our biological 
solidarity of seminal containment in Adam, in such a way 
that the two can be really separated by God-separated not 
only in theory (de potentia absoluta) but also in providential 
fact, in the case of Our Lady? For even if we grant that Adam's 
sin is the 11causa unica" of our own contraction, nevertheless, 
given that he did sin, is not our seminal containment in him 
the very bond which suffices, of itself, to assure that we also 
contract sin? Why, then, invent a second bond? Furthermore, 
is it not clear from the whole tradition of the Church that orig-
inal sin is contracted in and with the receipt of human nature 
by natural means? Is it not also clear that the soul itself is 
free of original sin until it informs the matter which, alone, is 
actually derived from Adam? Therefore, given only that Adam 
did sin, must we not look precisely to the metaphysical struc-
ture of natural generation, in order to find the cause of the 
soul's pollution? In a word, peccato Adae praesupposito, is 
not descent from him by natural generation the sufficient con-
dition for our contraction of his sin? 
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1.10.3. To answer this important objection, it will be wise 
to begin with some remarks regarding the terms "cause" and 
"sufficient condition." I have not spoken in this paper of the 
"cause" of peccatum originate originatum, except when citing 
another author (above, note 15). I have preferred instead to 
speak of necessary and sufficient conditions, so as to secure a 
less ambiguous terminology. We may illustrate with a com-
monplace example. 
1.10.4. It is well known that sunlight, focused through a lens, 
will cause a piece of paper to burn. The sunlight is the "cause." 
But if we try the experiment on a sunny day, and nothing hap-
pens, we may find that we do not have a powerful enough 
lens. We fetch another; and when fire results, we say that the 
lens is the "cause." Someone else may try the experiment on 
a sunny day, with the right kind of lens, but without result. 
We point out to him that he is holding the lens too close to 
the paper. When the position is corrected, and fire results, 
we say that the proper focus is the "cause." Thus the term 
"cause" is beset with ambiguity: in different situations, we 
call different factors the "cause" of one and the same effect. 
To avoid this situational ambiguity, it is standard practice in 
the sciences to call only the whole set of necessary factors the 
cause. Thus defined, "cause" is synonymous with "sufficient 
condition." The sufficient condition is simply the set of neces-
sary conditions. This empirical- scientific definition of "cause" 
will serve for theology with minor amendments, the chief of 
which is this: whereas the mathematicizing sciences often deal 
with "events" in actu signato, metaphysics and theology are 
concerned with events in actu exercito; hence, for our purposes, 
the "cause" must be just that set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions which obtained. 
1.10.5. In our case, the event to be explained is the actual 
receipt of original sin in some person, N. It has been argued 
above that this event will occur if and only if all of the follow-
ing factors are verified: (1) God's decree placing N in soli-
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clarity with Adam, (2) Adam's sin, (3) the natural communi-
cation of human nature to N, such that as a result N is a human 
person really related to Adam as ancestor. These three factors, 
then, are the sufficient condition, and each of them separately 
is a necessary condition. If all three are verified, N actually 
receives the characteristics (a, b, c ... }, which are the content 
of peccatum originate ot·iginatum. 
1.10.6. We must now examine the tenability of this view 
in the light of an objection which amounts to two related claims. 
The first claim is that more "necessary" conditions have been 
enumerated here than are really necessary (the mystical bond 
of solidarity being reducible to the biological bond) ; the second 
claim is that human flesh itself, derived from Adam, carries 
some sort of taint, such that when the soul informs that flesh, 
the soul contracts original sin. The two claims are related in 
that the second is a consequence of the first; for, if one elim-
inates the mystical bond as a separate factor, one must some-
how find an explanation for contraction within the fallen-
"natural" process itself. The result is a kind of theological bi-
ology of the fallen state, with its caro infecta. 
1.10.7. It is easy to refute the first of these claims by showing 
that every plausible theology of original sin presupposes the 
mystical bond as a distinct factor and cannot survive without it. 
For let us suppose that concupiscence is a major component of 
original sin and somehow plays a role in its transmission; let 
us further suppose that concupiscence can be somehow ex-
plained in biological terms as an inheritable trait; it remains 
true that to inherit concupiscence is not identically the same 
as to contract original sin. One must also inherit the privation 
of grace-an "inheritance" for which there is no biological 
explanation of any kind, nor could there be without reducing 
the mors animae to the natural order. Every adequate theology 
of original sin must explain the fact that I inherit privation of 
grace as a result of another man's sin, and no such theology 
invokes natural generation as the sufficient condition-other-
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wise it would have to be admitted that ·I inherit the moral 
effect of my own parents' actual sins. Why, then, do I inherit 
the guilt of Adam's sin but not that of my immediate progeni-
tors? It must be that I am bound up in solidarity with sinful 
Adam in a way in which I am not bound up in solidarity with 
my own sinful parents. Atqui, I am bound up with my parents 
via descent from them by natural generation. Ergo descent by 
natural generation must not be the only way in which I am 
in solidarity with Adam. However, if a second mode of soli-
darity must be admitted, what can it be except the mystical 
bond by which "many" were included in Adam? As in Adam 
many died, so in Christ shall many be made alive. In both 
cases, the decisive bond is mystical. Therefore, descent from 
sinful Adam by natural generation cannot be the sufficient 
condition for contracting original sin. 
1.10.8. Here an objection might be raised: it seems that the 
double bond theory makes God the real author of original sin 
in us. Here we have two descendants of Adam by natural gen-
eration, Martha and Mary. · God declares that Martha is in 
mystical solidarity with Adam and Mary is not. On what basis 
does He discriminate? But if we let descent by natural genera-
tion suffice for contraction, God is not to blame. 
1.10.9. I answer that the objection only postpones the prob-
lem. If natural descent suffices for contraction, Martha and 
Mary both contract. But here is a Mary who doesn't contract. 
Was she made an "exception"? Then God "discriminated" 
in her favor. In short, neither theory eliminates the so-called 
discrimination; but the debitum theory has the weakness of 
having to appeal to "exceptions"-an appeal which we have 
seen to be nonsense. 
1.10.10. As to the second claim-that flesh derived from 
Adam somehow pollutes the soul-it collapses as soon as one 
realizes that even the material aspect of original sin (con-
cupiscence) can be predicated only of the whole man and not 
-of his parts. For concupiscence, as a disorder seated in the 
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flesh, precisely qua disorder bespeaks relation to the rational 
soul as formal cause of the composite. Absent the soul, there is 
in the flesh neither order to its operations nor disorder. Thus, 
even materially considered, original sin can be no more pre-
dicated of a gamete than it can of a corpse. Hence nothing is 
gained by the classic appeal to "active" (vs. "passive") con-
ception. 
1.10.11. One must be clear on this point: the concrete species 
as bio-historical community in solidarity with Adam is a com-
munity of persons, not a gene pool. Granted, the community 
of persons presupposes a gene pool and hence a certain con-
tinuity of matter. But it does not consist therein. The species 
as concrete community consists of its members, namely, the per-
sons who are composites of body and soul. They alone are 
"in" the species, and they alone are "descended" from Adam, 
and only what is descended from Adam can either contract 
or convey original sin. 
1.10.12. Confusion on this point arises from a false dilemma 
concerning the soul as created by God. One asks whether the 
soul thus created, in the logical moment "before" it informs 
the flesh, is already tainted with original sin. To avoid. making 
God the author of sin, the question is answered in the negative. 
But if the soul issues forth clean and becomes soiled, there 
seems to be no alternative but to seek the contagion on the part 
of the flesh. This false dilemma is dissolved as soon as one 
sees that it involves a category mistake. Category mistakes 
often arise when the properties of who~es are predicated of 
parts. For example, from the fact that a chair is corp.fortable, 
it does not follow that boards and nails are comfortable. And 
from the fact that I have original sin, it does not follow that 
either my flesh or my soul has it, taken as parts prior to their 
union. 
1.10.13. After all, original sin is a state consequent upon 
solidarity with Adam, both moral and biological. This is why 
original sin is a malady restricted to the human species taken 
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concretely (that is, not only as metaphysical species but also 
as biO:.historical community) .24 What lies ouside this species 
(a stone, · an angel) cannot contract original sin. But St. 
Thomas explicitly teaches that the soul, taken simply as created 
and not "yet" informing organic matter, is not within the hu-
man species, because so taken it is only a part of man.25 Parts 
of wholes do not belong to the species of which only the wholes 
as wholes are instances. Indeed, according to Aquinas, the 
very "benefit" which the soul acquires in being united with its 
matter is its speci.fication.2e Hence the question whether the 
soul, prior to informing matter, has original sin, is not to be 
answered in the negative but to be rejected as a meaningless 
question. Now: what holds for one part precisely sub ratione 
partis must hold for other parts as well. Hence it is also 
meaningless to locate original sin in any sense in the pre-ani-
mated matter.27 
1.10.14. From this it follows that original sin does not arise 
formally in the soul by virtue of the soul's contact with matter, 
as though the matter were some sort of medium through which 
a contagion were conveyed. Rather, original sin arises in the 
soul because the soul is now the substantial form of this per-
son who happens to be in solidarity with Adam. Because the 
person-to-be will be in solidarity with Adam, the soul acquires 
Adam's sin when it is that person's soul and not before. God's 
non-act of not conserving in being the grace of some person 
24 A man created by God today ex nihilo would belong to the meta· 
physical species, but not to the bio-historical community deriving from 
Adam, and hence would not contract original sin. 
2 5 St. Thomas, Qttestiones de anima, q. 1, ad 13. 
26 St. Thomas, ibid., ad 12. 
2 7 Will it be objected that original sin is in the matter not forma/iter 
nor even matmaliter, but only virtttaliter? Perhaps, but only in this 
sense: because it is the person who contracts sin, whatever contributes 
constitutively to the existence o( the person contributes. to his existence in 
sin. Therefore, in the same sense it would have to be said that original 
sin is in the soul virtttaliter. Do the gametes participate in humanity 
virtttaliter active ex parte cattsae? So does the soul. 
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in solidarity with Adam has its negative "effect" only when 
that person exists, thus when the soul has already produced 
its "formal effect" of having informed this matter so as to 
produce the composite which is hie homo. A fortiori, if a neces-
sary condition for the reception of original sin in this soul 
is descent from Adam, then since descent from Adam is a re-
lation (to Adam as ancestor) which, as an accident, is conse-
quent upon the existence of hie homo as term of the generative 
act, it follows that neither grace nor sin can be predicated of 
either constituent part of man prior to the existence of hie homo, 
which is the formal effect of the soul ut reeepta. Therefore, it 
makes no sense to ask whether the soul, simply ut ereata, is in 
grace or in sin, and it also makes no sense to ask whether the 
matter simply ut disposita is "infected." Hence there is no 
earo infecta. Only the child himself, as existent, can fulfill a 
necessary condition (descent from Adam) for God's non-con-
serving his grace in view of his mystical solidarity with Adam, 
which is another necessary condition. 
1.10.15. From these considerations it is evident that Our Lady 
was not subject to Law III. She was not included in Adam 
as moral or mystical head of the race; and absent this mystical 
bond, her receipt of flesh derived from sinful parents, them-
selves included in Adam, is not a sufficient condition for her 
own contraction of sin. 
1.10.16. But can it be said that she "should" have been sub-
ject to Law III? The debitum-defender will have to answer 
affirmatively, and he might do so on two distinct grounds: 
(a) Our Lady should have been subject to Law III because 
she should have been subject to Law II; 
(b) Our Lady should have been subject to Law III because 
flesh derived from sinful Adam was involved in her active 
conception. 
The arguments for both grounds have been eliminated al-
ready. 
1.11.0. Therefore, the first half of this paper is finished. 
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A survey of the data of faith regarding original sin and its 
transmission has disclosed no tenable point of departure for 
a theological proof of the debitum peccati. There simply is 
no "owe," "ought," "had to," or "should have" for the debere 
to express from this starting point. 
2.0.0. However, the debitum-defender could assume the 
alternative starting point. Instead of reasoning from original 
sin (the so-called terminus a quo), he could reason from the 
meaning of the Immaculate Conception itself ( the terminus 
ad quem of Our Lady's redemption). The reasoning is con-
siderably simpler by this route and might take either of two 
forms. 
2.1.0. First and most fundamentally, a case for the debitum 
might observe that the Immaculate Conception is a redemption. 
Atqui a redemption is a freeing, deliverance, or rescue. Such 
terms strictly presuppose a predicament from which one is 
delivered, rescued, etc. For, if one is not redeemed from some 
predi:cament, one is not redeemed. In the context of Catholic 
thology, this predicament must be the state of sin or alienation 
from God_. Therefore, whoever is redeemed must have been 
in a state of sin-either actually or potentially. From the uni-
versal, one may infer the particular: if Mary is redeemed, she 
must have been in a state of sin-either actually or potentially. 
The dogma of 1854 eliminates, of course, the former possibility 
(that she was actually in sin) but not the latter. Indeed, the 
prima facie wording of the dogma implies her potential state 
of sin by calling her redemption a "preservation." For there 
is no preservation save from a potential (indeed, imminent) 
danger. The term "debitum peccati," whether felicitous or 
infelicitous, simply denotes this subjection to an imminent 
danger (or potential state) of sin. Therefore, since it must 
be admitted that Our Lady was subject to this danger, it must 
be admitted that she had a debitum peccati. 
2.1.1. The above argument fails for two reasons: its minor 
is methodologically incorrect, and its conclusion is unintelligi-
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ble. The minor ·proceeds incorrectly becaus~ it amounts to 
the erroneous assumption that the entailments of a predicate 
("redeemed") can be inferred from its etymology. The con-
clusion is unintelligible because, so long as the debitum is taken 
as unconditional, there is no tenable answer to the question of 
wherein this "danger" consists. These contentions will now 
be defended, in reverse order. 
2.1.2. Assume that the argument presented in 2.1.0. is sound. 
If so, there existed some real subjection to danger or potentiality 
for contraction of original sin in Mary's case. It is necessary to 
say in what this real potentiality consisted, and (to this writer's 
knowledge) there are but two candidates. One is the caro in-
fecta'allegedly involved in Mary's active conception-an illu-
sion dispelled above in l.lO.lO.ff. The other candidate, more 
abstract, is Mary's "subjection to the laws"· of ~riginal sin's 
transmission. But once these laws are correctly formulated 
{l.l.O.ff.), and the relevant sense of "law" is clarified (1.4.1.ff., 
1.6.2.ff., 1.8.1.ff.), it becomes clear that no such subjection exists 
in her case. Therefore, it becomes unexpectedly difficult to 
say in what real factor this "subjection" or "potentiality" could 
have resided. This fact strongly suggests that something has 
gone amiss in the argument by which the existence of such 
a reality was posited-a suspicion confirmed by a look at the 
minor. 
2.1.3. From the fact that deliverance from prison or a similar 
predicament is the original or etymological sense of "redemp-
tion," it does not follow that such deliverance is the meaning 
of the term in actual usage. Medieval linguistic philosophy 
was already able to distinguish between etymology and usage 
(e.g. St. Thomas's treatment of lapis, in Summa Theologiae 
I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2), but certain influential hermeneutical the-
ories of the 19th and 20th centuries have tried to reach deeper 
results ("primordial determinations") by blurring the distinc-
tion. Apart from Heidegger's curious renditions of the pre-
Socratics, these theories have been ·applied mainly to the Bib-
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lical materials-with results which, from the standpoint of con-
temporary semantics, w.ill rarely bear inspection.28 The merit 
of first recognizing the relevance of recent semantic method to 
the problem of what "redemption" might mean in Our Lady's 
case belongs to J.-F. Bonnefoy.29 Neither his factual findings 
nor those of others (e.g. the usage of the term "redemption" 
as applied to the angels) need be repeated here. 80 What matters 
for present purposes is simply the undeniable upshot of their 
researches, namely, that the actual usage of the term "re-
deemed" (and its cognates) in Scripture, the Fathers, and 
Church documents is too fluid to give cogency to the argument 
of the debitum-defender. 
2.1.4. Moreover, it is both enlightening and amusing to note 
the semantic parallel between "redeemed" and "created." Sup-
pose that 'x is redeemed' presupposes a state of sin from which 
x was delivered. By similar etymological evidence, 'x is created' 
presupposes a nothingness or non-being from which x was 
drawn. Then, just as maculism is the claim that 'xis redeemed' 
entails 'there is a time, t, such that x was in sin at t,' so there 
is a medieval theory of creation according to which 'x is created' 
entails 'there is a time, t, such that x did not exist at t.' 
Aquinas's attitude towards this theory is well known. While 
admitting that creation involves a real relation, with the crea-
ture as subject, he assigns as term of the relation not an an-
tecendent nothingness but the Necessary Being by Whom esse 
is efficiently communicated to the creature. For Aquinas, then, 
'to be created' means 'to have existence as an accident from 
Another in whom existence is essential.' Hence 'x is created' 
entails the logical contingency of 'x exists' but entails nothing 
28 For a survey and devastating critique, see James Barr, The Se-
mantics of Biblical Language (Oxford, 1961), esp. 107ff. 
29 Cf. Bonnefoy, art. cit., in Ephemerides Mariologicae 4 (1954) 31lff. 
3° Cf., e.g., Pedro de Alcantara Martinez, O.F.M., La redencion de 
Marfa y los meritos de Cristo, in Estudios Franciscanos 55 (1954) 195-
253; Alejandro de Villalmonte, O.F.M.Cap., Marfa Inmacrtlada, exenta 
del debito del pecado original, in Virgo Immacrtlata 11 (1957) 131. 
45
Marshner: A Logician's Reflections on the Debitum
Published by eCommons, 1978
A Logician's Reflections on the Debit11m 179 
about the duration of that existence. Hence the fact that the 
world had a beginning in time is taken by Aquinas as a datum 
of faith distinct from the datum of creation itself and not de-
ducible from it. If the Thomistic theory of redemption had 
been less Augustinian and more closely modeled on the orig-
inality of Aquinas's theory of creation, redemption might have 
been defined as 'to have grace through the merits of another' 
- formula whereby reference to an antecedent lack of grace 
would likewise have been replaced by preference to an extrinsic 
meritorious cause of grace.. Then, at least, there would have 
been no Thomistic case for maculism. 
2.1.5. To press the parallel a step further: suppose it is 
agreed that, if an entity which has its esse efficiently communi-
cated to it ab alio is still "created," even though the communica-
tion take place from eternity, then a person whose grace is com-
municated to her ex merito alterius is still "redeemed," even 
though the communication take place from conception. By 
the debitist semantics of "redemption," however, it would 
still follow that this person is redeemed if and only if she 
has at least a real or natural potentiality for original sin-
a debitum contrahendi peccatum. Pari ratione, there is again 
a theory of creation according to which 'x is created' entails 
that 'x of itself has a real potentiality for non-being' or tends 
towards nothingness (a debitum non-essendi?). Shall we call 
this a debitist theory of creation? Whatever we call it, it is 
just the view of those Parisian theologians whom Cajetan con-
sidered too ignorant to be worthy of reply.31 These gentlemen 
had attacked Aquinas' orthodoxy because the Angelic Doctor 
had maintained that there could be creatures (e.g., the angels 
and heavenly bodies) which were immutable in the sense that 
they had within themselves no potentiality for non-being.32 The 
line of attack is obvious: what cannot not-be, necessarily is; 
u Cajetan, In Primam Partem, q. 9, a. 2, in fine. 
32 St. Thomas, Srtmma Contra Gentiles, II, c. 30. 
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hence Aquinas makes certain creatures necessary beings, in 
which case they are no longer creatures-which is heresy. 
2.1.6. Cajetan's reply (which is of the highest interest philo-
sophically because it contrasts the logical issue of modal 
operators with the metaphysical issue of act and potency) 
richly deserves to be applied to the debitum controversy. It 
consists of three points: ( 1) the attack envisages intrinsic po-
tentialities only and hence fails to take extrinsic ones into ac-
count (i.e. though immutable in !e, the creature might be mut-
able through a power existing in alia) ; ( 2) the attack posits 
in creatures a real potency which looks directly and primarily 
to non-existence, whereas in fact there is no such potency in 
anything (for, of course, non-being can hardly be the "act" 
of any real potency); rather, what is properly in question is 
whether every creature must, of itself, have a potency to some 
esse incompossible with its present esse-to which the ariswer 
is "no"l (3) most fundamentally, the attack confuses real with 
logical possibility, and real with logical necessity. In both 
usages "necessary" is defined as "not possibly not" l but real 
necessity denies in the entity any component (e.g. matter) 
which would persist through a substantial change and hence 
have a potency to another esse, while logical necessity means 
only that the terms of a proposition are so related that its nega-
tion is self-contradictory. Similarly, real possibility or potency 
is a potency within the substance in question, whereas logical 
possibility means only that the denial of a proposition is not 
self-contradictory. Thus in real terms, there are necessary (im-
mutable) and non-necessary (mutable) creatures;. but in logi-
cal terms, it can be said of every creature that it might riot be 
(thus is logically non-nece.ssary). Finally, because it is said 
that God has (de potentia absoluta) the power to bring about 
whatever is logically possible, the logical possibility that 'a is 
not,' where a stands for a particular creature, is correlated with 
a real power in God to bring it about that a is not (i.e. to an-
nihilate a)- without there being in a itself any real potency to 
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be other than it is. Similarly, in Marian theology, no one denies 
that the proposition, "Mary is immaculately conceived," is a 
contingent proposition and that God had the power to bring it 
about that she was not so conceived, had He willed it. Hence 
the logical possibility of "Mary contracts original sin" is not 
in question. What distinguishes debitism is its insistence on a 
real possibility over and above the logical one. 
2.1.7. The peculiar difficulty of saying wherein this real 
possibility consists has already been noted, and we may now 
add a further explanation of the difficulty: real possibilities 
are transcendentally relative to real acts, but a non-being (priva-
tion or disorder) such as original sin is not a real act. There-
fore, there can be no such real possibility. Hence the debitist 
semantics of 'redemption" leads to positing an absurdity-an 
absurdity exactly parallel to the "innate tendency towards noth-
ingness" which Cajetan mocked. 
2.1.8. By contrast, a non-debitist semantics of "redemption" 
is exactly parallel to the Thomist semantics of "creation." Mary 
can be called "redeemed" simply because she does not of her-
self possess grace but has it from another (because there can 
be no creature to whom grace is connatural) and through the 
merits of another (because all the grace which has come into 
the world has come through the merits of Christ) . Hence 
"Mary is immaculate" is a contingent truth. Its negation is 
contingently, not logically, false. Mary could be said to need 
no redemption if and only if her elevation to grace were some-
how necessary. The human soul of Jesus is elevated to grace as 
a necessary effect of the hypostatic union, but nothing in Mary's 
ontological make-up requires her grace. Her elevation is and 
remains God's free gift. 
2.1.9. Nothing in this argument is weakened or changed 
by the additional qualification of "preservative" redemption. 
"Preservative" expresses the fact that in Mary's unique case the 
grace flowing from Christ's merits is communicated to her with-
out there having been any antecedent state of sin in her. Grace 
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and sin are related as contradictories (like light and darkness) , 
not as contraries. Unlike contraries, contradictories can only 
replace each other without intermediacy. Hence the grace 
coming to her simultaneously with her existence can be called 
"preservative" because its existence in her was not preceded 
by an actual state-of-sin and because its existence in her re-
placed any logically possible state-of-sin. The distinction be-
tween logical and real possibility is once again crucial; for it 
is impossible to show that the ratio of "preservation" requires 
anything more than logical possibility. 
2.1.10. To confirm this point, it will be well to formalize 
somewhat the very complex notion of "preservation." One 
finds that one is dealing with a many-sided relation, involving 
at least one agent (x) which preserves, an object(y) preserved, 
an undesirable predicate (F) which y is preserved from having, 
a predicate of integrity (G) which y has as a result of some 
action of x upon y ( xRy), and hence (it is presupposed) a 
predicate (H) which x has and by virtue of which xis able to 
act upon y with the desired result ( Gy). In other words, what 
counts as an instance of "preservation" is not some one thing or 
property, but rather a whole causal situation.33 One is dealing 
with a causality of x upon y, but one calls this causality a "pres-
ervation of y" if and only if the following additional condi-
tions are met: the predicates F and G are mutually exclusive, 
and it is at least sometimes better that a thing be G rather than 
be F, and there was never a past time, tp, when the thing acted 
upon was F (otherwise, one would have "restoration" rather 
than "preservation"), and apart from this causality, it is at 
least logically possible for the thing to be F (otherwise, one 
might have a case of "immunity" or even "incorruptibility," 
but hardly "preservation"). 
The above account is intended to serve only for relatively 
33 For the analysis of causality used here, see I. M. Bochenski, O.P., 
On Analogy, in The Thomist 11 (1948); reprinted in Albert Menne 
(Ed.), Logico-Philosophical Strtdies (Dordrecht, 1962) 106. 
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simple cases. More complex situations, such as those in which 
the free cooperation of the party-to-be-preserved is required, 
would have to involve some additional stipulations. Since 
Mary's free cooperation was not required in her Immaculate 
Conception itself, it seems possible to use this mystery as an 
'interpretation' of the account here given. We replace the 
variables 'x' and 'y' with individual constants 'a' and 'b' re-
spectively; then let 'a' and 'b' stand for God and Mary respec-
tively, 'R' for infusion of grace, 'F' for contraction of original 
sin, and 'G' for being filled with grace. 
Of the many things thus involved in the assertion of "pres-
ervation," the most crucial for present purposes is the logical 
possibility of Fb (in our case, "Mary contracts original sin"). 
Since no Catholic theologian denies that God could have 
brought it about that Fb, there is clearly a consensus that Fb 
is at least logically possible. Further, before Gb ("Mary is filled 
with grace") was true, it is excluded that Fb was ever true. 
Now suppose that for a given domain of objects (e.g., human 
beings descended from Adam) F and G are not only mutually 
exclusive but also exhaustive alternatives. Then it will follow 
that before Gb was true, if Fb was never true, b did not exist. 
Atqui what does not exist has no real potencies or tendencies 
of any kind. Hence on these suppositions, which are verified 
in Mary's case, Fb is at most logically posible. (Only the un-
tenable appeal to ca1'o infecta in Mary's active conception has 
served historically to mask the validity of this conclusion.) 
· 2.1.11. Therefore: since the logical possibility in question 
means only that, if both Mary and original sin exist, "Mary 
contracts original sin" is contingently, not logically, false; and 
since this logical possibility is therefore not denied even by 
those who reject all debitum in Our Lady, it follows that the 
argument from the meaning of "redemption," if rightly carried 
out, concludes only to what no one denies. Hence the argument 
creates no basis for the debitum. 
2.2.0. The second form which reasoning from the meaning 
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of the Immaculate Conception itself might take, in order to 
conclude to. a debitum of some kind, is still more direct. It be-
gins with a truth which no Catholic can deny: apart from 
God, there is no other cause of Our Lady's sinlessness-at-con-
ception. Therefore it is perfectly true to say that Mary did not 
contract original sin because God preserved her. Now, not by 
syllogistic reasoning but by immediate inference, this causal 
statement seems to justifiy another statement: 
(A) Mary would have contracted <J1'iginal sin, if she bad 
not been preserved. 
This is the counterfactual conditional which was mentioned 
in the introduction to the present essay. As soon as (A) is 
admitted, it becomes possjble, even necessary, to raise a further 
question: why would she have contracted the sin? If she 
would have contracted it, there must be some reason why she 
would have contracted it. Nothing happens without a reason. 
Therefore, if she truly would have contracted, there must be 
some cause by virtue of which she would have contracted sin, 
if God had not caused the opposite. And so we have cause 
against cause. Our Lady, it seems, was subject to two causal-
ities--the one to make sin, the Other to make grace-so related 
that if the Other had not preserved her, the one would have 
corrupted her. This subjection to a corruptive cause is just the 
meaning of her debitum. The nature of the corruptive caus~ 
whether something intrinsic to Mary's make-up (e.g. the ca1'o 
infecta) or something extrinsic (e.g. a law conceived as some 
sort of impersonal "force" existing in the real)-is left to 
speculation. What is crucial is not the nature of the cause 
but the necessity to posit one, if she truly would have con-
tracted. 
2.2.1. There is thus a peculiarity to the debitum proposed by 
way of this argument. Unlike the previous versions, this de-
bitum arises from a counterfactual conditional and requires 
the use of such a conditional in its statement. Hence -it is often 
called a debitum conditionatum or hypotheticum. But here one 
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must note some ambiguities; for in fact to propose such a 
debitum might be tantamount to any of three distinct claims. 
2.2.2 First, one might be claiming that the conditions suf-
ficient for anyone to contract original sin existed in Mary's 
case in the actual world, so that she would have contracted-
indeed, would necessarily have contracted the sin-if only 
events had taken their normal course.' On this view, the cor-
ruptive cause to which Mary was "subject" really existed and 
would have borne its bitter fruits, if God had not "intervened." 
Bu.t this claim (despite the cosmetic improvement of using 
counterfactual phraseology) is the old piec~ of incoherence we 
);lave remarked already at length, namely, the untenable claim 
that a truly sufficient condition may obtain and yet its conse-
quent not obtain (vide supra, 1.6.2-1. 7.2) . Hence, if the de-
bitum conditionatum amounts to, this first claim, it presents 
nothing new and has been refuted already. 
2.2.3. Secondly, one might be claiming only that the con-
ditions sufficient for anyone to contract original sin might have 
existed in Mary's case, and that if they had existed, she would 
have had to contract the sin. On this view, the corruptive cause 
is not alleged to have existed in Mary's case in the actual world; 
hence she was not actually subject to such a cause but only po-
tentially subject. In such a position, there are novel elements 
not yet considered in this essay. Here the debitum-defender is 
no longer obliged to allege a real potency in Mary. (Of course, 
he might continue to do so; he might invent a remote real po-
tency to have the proximate real potency to contract; but he 
has no real need of such maneuvers.) He requires only the 
logical possibility of some situation in which Mary contracts 
necessarily. Then, if he can actually stipulate that situation by 
stating it in the protasis of a counterfactual conditional whose 
truth is certified, he establishes his case. 
2.2.4. Thirdly, however, one might intend a still weaker 
claim. One might wish to say only that, if some quite possible 
circumstance had obtained, Mary would in fact have contracted 
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original sin. Whether she would have been obliged or neces-
sitated to do so is left in suspension. In other words, one might 
wish to do no more than assert the truth of some conditional 
formula whose apodosis is, "Mary would have contracted orig-
inal sin." 
2.2.5. It is open to question, however, whether so weak a 
claim as this last any longer counts as a version of the debitum. 
Many authors who deny all debitum in Our Lady have admitted 
the truth of one or more counterfactuals of the type in question. 
But here again the argument is beset by ambiguities. For ex-
ample, so long as the debitum itself is taken to be some sort 
of obligation in justice to contract the sin, one might rightly 
deny that such an "obligation" makes any sense and yet af-
firm that there are circumstances under which Mary factually 
"would have" contracted. In such a case, to hold that the ·ad-
mission of a conditional formula is not the admission of a 
debitum (and is in fact consistent with the denial of all de-
bitum) makes good sense. But suppose the debitum itself is 
taken to mean only a conditional "necessity" to contract the 
sin. In other words, suppose the debitum just means that there 
is known to theology a sufficient condition, under which any-
one contracts. Then the debitum conditionatum will mean only 
that if that condition had been fulfilled in Mary's case, it 
would have been sufficient in her case also; hence she would 
have contracted the sin necessarily. In such a context, the as-
sertion that a theologian may admit the truth of a conditional 
formula while denying all debitum becomes rather suspect. 
Does such a theologian mean to say that there is no sufficient 
condition for the contraction of original sin? That there may 
be one, but theology does not know it? That in the very sit-
uation in which Mary would contract sin, she would do so 
merely as a matter of brute fact and not under the intelligibility 
of a known law? Such claims are distinctly curious; one doubts 
that any theologian has intended to make them. Hence, where 
the debitum merely means a nomological necessity, and where 
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the debitum conditionatum merely means that in some specifi-
able circumstance, Mary would have been subject to the law 
and hence would have contracted necessarily, there is no sound 
distinction between admitting the truth of an informative 
(non-analytic) conditional formula and admitting the debitum 
conditionatum. 
2.2.6. Nothing advanced in this essay excludes the possibility 
of such a debitum conditionatum. A forthcoming sequel to 
this paper will set forth a general critique of Marian counter-
factual formulae. 
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